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Race and the New Reproduction
by
DoRoTHY E. RoBERTs*

Introduction
New means of procreating are heralded by many legal scholars
and social commentators as inherently progressive and liberating. In
this view, in vitro fertilization (IVF), embryo donation, and contract
pregnancy expand the procreative options open to individuals and
therefore enhance human freedom. These innovations give new hope
to infertile couples previously resigned to the painful fate of childlessness. In addition, this view holds that the new reproduction creates
novel family arrangements that break the mold of the traditional nuclear family. A child may now have five parents: a genetic mother and
father who contribute egg and sperm, a gestational mother who carries the implanted embryo, and a contracting mother and father who
intend to raise the child.l A proponent of new means of reproduction,
John Robertson opens his book Children of Choice by proclaiming
that these "powerful new technologies" free us from the ancient subjugation to "the luck of the natural lottery" and "are challenging basic
notions about procreation, parenthood, family, and children." 2
My impression of these technologies, however, is that they are
more conforming than liberating: they more often reinforce the status
quo than challenge it. True, these technologies often free outsiders
from the constraints of social convention and legal restrictions. They
have helped single heterosexual women, lesbians, and gay men, whom
* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. B.A. 1977, Yale College;
J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School. This is a written version of a talk presented at Rutgers
University's Center for the Critical Analysis of Culture and University of California, Hastings College of the Law; I am grateful to the participants for their comments. Portions of
this article are adapted from Dorothy E. Roberts , The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cm. L. REv . 209
(1995).
1. See generally John L. Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent "?: The Claims of
Biology as the Basis fo r Parental Rights , 66 N. Y.U. L. REv. 353 , 355 (199 1); A ndrea E.
Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Rep roductive Technologies, 96
YALE L.J. 187, 192-94 (1986).
2. John Robertson, CHILD REN OF CHOicE: FREEDOM AND T HE NEw REPRODU CTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3 (1995).
(935]
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society regards as unqualified to raise children, to circumvent legal
barriers to parenthood. 3 Informal surrogacy arrangements between
women, for example, may provide a means of self-help for women
who wish to have children independently of men; moreover, they have
the advantage of requiring no government approval, medical intervention, or even sexual intercourse. 4
But these technologies rarely serve to subvert conventional family norms. Most often they complete a traditional nuclear family by
providing a married couple with a child. 5 Rather than disrupt the stereotypical family, they enable infertile couples to create one. Most
IVF clinics only accept heterosexual married couples as clients, 6 and
most physicians have been unwilling to assist in the insemination of
single women.7 The new reproduction's conservative function is often
imposed by courts and legislatures, as well. Laws regulating artificial
insemination contemplate use by a married woman and recognition of
her husband as the child's father, 8 and recent state legislation requiring insurance coverage of IVF procedures applies only when a wife's
eggs are fertilized using her husband's sperm. 9 On the other hand, as
Martha Field observes, courts have been willing to grant parental
rights to sperm donors "when no other man is playing the role of father for the child," such as when the mother is a lesbian or
unmarried. 10
3. See Nancy D . Polikoff, This Child D oes Have Two Moth ers: Redefinin g
Parenthood to Meet the N eeds of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional
Families , 78 GEo. L.J . 459, 466 (1990) ; Sharon E . Rush, Breaking with Tradition: Surrogacy
and Gay Fathers, in KI NDRED MAITERS: R ETHINK ING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE F AMILY
102, 132-33 (Diana Tie tjens M eyers et a!. eds., 1993) .
4. Juliette Zipper & Selma Sevenhuijsen , Surrogacy: Feminist Notions of Motherhood Reconsidered , in RE PRODUcriVE TECHNOLOGIES: GE NDER, MOTHERHOOD AND
MEDICINE 118, 137-38 (Michelle Stanworth ed ., 1987). Under this arrangem e nt , a fe rtile
wo man wo uld informally promise an infertil e woman who wants a child to impregna te
he rself with a man's sperm and to give the baby to the infertile woman for a doption .
5. R obe rtson , supra note 2 , at 145 (noting that ass isted r eproduction furthers the
" primary a im to provide a couple with a child to live and re ar in a two-pa re nt fam ily") .
6. Thomas A. Shannon, In Vitro Fertilization: Ethical Issu es, in EMBRYos, E THICS ,
AND W OMEN'S RIGHTS: E XPLORING THE NEW REPRO DUcriVE T ECHNOLOG IES 155, 163
(E la in e H offman Baruch e t a l. eds ., 1988) .
7. D aniel Wikler & No rma J. Wikl e r, Tu rkey-baster Bab ies: Th e D emedicalization of
A rtificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5, 13-1 6 (1991) .
8. Bartha M. Knoppers & Soni a LeBris , Recent A dvances in Medically Assisted Conception: L egal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J .L. & MED . 329, 332-33, 346-47 (1991) ;
Lisa C. Ik emoto, D estabiliz ing Thoughts on Surrogacy L egislation , 28 U.S .F. L. RE v. 633,
636-37 (1 994 ).
9. See, e.g., M o . CooE ANN ., A rt. 48a, § 354 DD (3) (West 1995) ; HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 43 1: 10A-11 6. 5(3) (West 1995).
10. MARTHA FIELD, SuRROGATE MoTHERHO OD 11 6 (1988).
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Feminists have powerfully demonstrated that the new reproduction enforces traditional patriarchal roles that privilege men's genetic
desires and objectify women's procreative capacity.l 1 They make a
convincing case that IVF serves more to help married men produce
genetic offspring than to give women greater reproductive freedom. 12
In this essay I will explore how these technologies reflect and reinforce the racial hierarchy in America. I will focus primarily on in vitro
fertilization because it is the technology least accessible to Black people and most advantageous to those concerned about genetic linkages.13 The salient feature of in vitro fertilization that distinguishes it
from other means of assisted reproduction is that it enables an infertile couple to have a child who is genetically-related to the husband.l 4

I.
A.

The Role of Race in the New Reproduction

Racial Disparity in the Use of Reproductive Technologies

One of the most striking features of the new reproduction is that
it is used almost exclusively by white people. Of course, the busiest
fertility clinics can point to some Black patients; but they stand out as
rare exceptions.1 5 Only about one-third of all couples experiencing
infertility seek medical treatment at all; and only 10 to 15 percent of
infertile couples use advanced techniques like IVF.16 Blacks make up
a disproportionate number of infertile people avoiding reproductive
technologies.
When I was recently transfixed by media coverage of battles over
adopted children, "surrogacy" contracts, and frozen embryos, a friend
11. See, e.g. , Janice G. Raymond, W oMEN AS WoMBs: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE O VER WoMEN's FREEDOM (1993); Barbara Ka tz Rothman, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SO CIETY (1989);
REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES (Joan C. Ca ll ahan ed.,
1995).
12. See, e.g. , Susan Sherwin, No LoNGER PATIENT: FEMINIST Ennes AND HEALTH
CARE 127 (1992).
13. I capitalize the " B" in Black Americans because I believe that B lack Americans
consider themselves to be an ethnic group, like Asian-Americans, whereas I believe that
white Americans do not see themselves in that way.
14. As I explain below, many women who could conceive through artific ia l inse mination prefer the more expensive and risky IYF beca use it can produ ce a baby with a genet ic
link to their husband. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
15. See Lori B . Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternmive Rep roducrion, 65 S. CAL.
LREv. 623,646 (1991); F .P. Haseltine eta!. , Psychologicallnrerviews in Screening Co uples
Undergoing In Vitro Fertilizarion , 442 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Scr. 504, 507 (1985); Martha
Southgate, Coping with Infertility, EsSENCE, Sept. 1994, at 28 , 28.
16. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDI CA L AND SO CIAL
CHOICES (OTA-BA-358) 7, 49-60 (1988).
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questioned my interest in the new methods of reproduction. "Why
are you always so fascinated by those stories?," he asked. "They have
nothing to do with Black people." 17 Think about the images connected with reproduction-assisting technologies: They are almost always of white people. And the baby in these stories often has blond
hair and blue eyes-as if to emphasize her racial purity. A "Donahue" show featured the family of the first public surrogacy adoption.
Their lawyer Noel Keane describes the baby, Elizabeth Anne, as
"blonde-haired, blue-eyed, and as real as a baby's yell." 18 He concludes, "The show was one of Donahue's highest-rated ever and the
audience came down firmly on the side of what Debbie, Sue, and
George had done to bring Elizabeth Anne into the world." 19
In January, 1996, the New York Times launched a prominent
four-article series entitled The Fertility Market, and the front page
photograph displayed the director of a fertility clinic surrounded by
seven white children conceived there while the continuing page featured a set of beaming IVF triplets, also white. 20
When we do read news accounts involving Black children created
by these technologies they are always sensational stories intended to
evoke revulsion at the technologies' potential for harm. In 1990, a
white woman brought a lawsuit against a fertility clinic which she
claimed had mistakenly inseminated her with a Black man's sperm,
rather than her husband's, resulting in the birth of a Black child. 21
Two reporters covering the story speculated that "[i]f the suit goes to
trial, a jury could be faced with the difficult task of deciding the damages involved in raising an interracial child. " 22 Although receiving the
wrong gametes was an injury in itself, the fact that the gametes were
of the wrong race added a unique dimension of harm to the error.
In a similar, but more bizarre, incident in the Netherlands in
1995, a woman who gave birth to twin boys as a result of IVF realized
when the babies were two months old that one was white and one was
17. 1 first recounted this story in Roberts, supra note *,at 209.
18. Noel P. Keane & Dennis L. Breo, T HE SuRRO GATE MOTHER 96 (1981).
19. !d.
20. Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope 's Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996,
at 1, 10.
21 . Robin Schatz, "Sp erm Mixup " Spurs Debate: Questioning Safeguards, R egularions, N.Y. N EWSDA Y , Mar. 11 , 1990, a t 3; Ronald Sulli van, Mother Accuses Sperm Bank of
a Mixup, N.Y TI MES, Mar. 9, 1990, at Bl.
22. Barbara Kantrowitz & David A . Kaplan , No t the R ighi Fa rher, N EwswEEK, Ma r.
19, 1990, a t 50, 50.
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Black.23 A Newsweek article subtitled "A Fertility Clinic's Startling
Error" reported that "while one boy was as blond as his parents, the
other's skin was darkening and his brown hair was fuzzy." 24
It is easy to conclude that the stories displaying blond-haired
blue-eyed babies born to white parents are designed to portray the
positive potential of the new reproduction, while the stories involving
the mixed-race children reveal its potential horror.
These images and the predominant use of IVF by white couples
indisputably reveal that race in some way helps to shape both the use
and popularity of IVF in America. What are the reasons underlying
this connection between race and the new reproduction?
First, the racial disparity in new reproduction has nothing to do
with rates of infertility. Married Black women have an infertility rate
one and one-half times higher than that of married white women. 25 In
fact, the profile of people most likely to use IVF is precisely the opposite of those most likely to be infertile. The people in the United
States most likely to be infertile are older, poorer, Black and poorly
educated. 26 Most couples who use IVF services are white, highly educated, and affluent. 27
Besides, the new reproduction has far more to do with enabling
people (mostly men) to have children who are genetically related to
them than with helping infertile people to have children. 28 T'n e wellknown "surrogacy" cases such as Baby M and Anna I. involved fertile
white men with infertile wives who hired gestational mothers in order
to pass on their own genes. Moreover, at least half of women who
undergo IVF are themselves fertile , although their husbands are not. 29
These women could conceive a child far more safely and inexpensively
by using artificial insemination although the child would not be genet23. Dorinda Elliott & Friso Endt, Twins- With Two Fath ers; The Netherlands: A Fertility Clinic's Startling Error, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38, 38.
24. !d.
25. La uri e Nsiah-Jefferson & Elaine J. Hall, R eproductive Technology: Perspectives
and Imp lications for Low-Income Women and Women of Color, in HEA LING TECHNOLOGY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 93, 108 (Kathryn Strother Ratcliff et al. eds. , 1989 ).
26. Sevgi 0. Aral & Willard Cates, Jr., The Increasing Concern Wirh Infenility: Why
Now?, 250 JAMA 2327, 2327 (1983).
27. Andrews & Douglass, supra note 15, at 646.
28. Joan C. Callahan , Introduction to REPROD UCTION , ETHICS AND THE LAw: FEiviiNIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at 24-25.
29. Raymond, supra note 11, at 6; Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift, or Parriarchal Bargain ?: Women's Consent to In Vitro Fertilization in i'Vlale Infeni!ity, in FEMINIST P E RSPECTIVES IN IVIEDICAL ETHICS 169, 171 (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura M . Purdy eds.,
1992).
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ically-related to the husband. Underlying their use of IVF, then, is
often their husbands' insistence on having a genetic inheritance. In
short, use of reproduction-assisting technologies does not depend
strictly on the physical incapacity to produce a child.
Instead, the reason for the racial disparity in fertility treatment
appears to be a complex interplay of financial barriers, cultural preferences, and more deliberate professional manipulation. The high cost
of the IVF procedure places it out of reach of most Black people
whose average median income falls far below that of whites. The median cost of one procedure is about $8,000; and, due to low success
rates, many patients try several times before having a baby or giving
up. 30 Most medical insurance plans do not cover IVF, nor is it included in Medicaid benefits. 31 IVF requires not only huge sums of
money, but also a privileged lifestyle that permits devotion to the arduous process of daily drug injections, ultrasound examinations and
blood tests, egg extraction, travel to an IVF clinic, and often multiple
attempts-a luxury that few Black people enjoy. As Dr. O'Delle
Owens, a Black fertility specialist in Cincinnati explained, "'For White
couples, infertility is often the first roadblock they've faced-while
Blacks are distracted by such primary roadblocks as food, shelter and
clothing."' 32 Black people's lack of access to fertility services is also
an extension of their more general marginalization from the health
care system.
There is evidence that some physicians and fertility clinics may
deliberately steer Black patients away from reproductive technologies. For example, doctors are more likely to diagnose white professional women with infertility problems such as endometriosis that can
be treated with in vitro fertilization. 33 In 1976, one doctor found that
over 20 percent of his Black patients who had been diagnosed as having pelvic inflammatory disease, often treated with sterilization, actually suffered from endometriosis.34
30. Gabriel, sup ra note 20, at 10-11.
31. Annetta Miller et al. , Baby Makers Inc., NEWSWE EK, Jun e 29, 1992, at 38, 38;
Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10; George J. A nnas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, 16 L.
ED. HEALTH CARE 27, 28 (1988) . Only 10 states require insurance cove rage of IVF.
Gabriel, supra note 20, at 10.
32. Monique Burns, A Sexual Tim e Bomb: The Declining Fertility Rate of che Black
!'lliddle Class, EBONY, May 1995, at 74, 76.
33. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Desrabiliz ing Thoughts on Surrogacy Legisiation, 28 U.S.F. L.
.f->.E V . 633, 639 (1994).
34. Don ald L. Chatm an, Endomerriosis in the Biack Wom an, 125 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
(.?,; GYNE COLOGY 987, 987 (1976) .
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Screening criteria not based specifically on race tend to exclude
Black women, as well. Most Black children in America today are
born to single mothers, so a rule requiring clients to be married would
work disproportionately against Black women desiring to become
mothers. One IVF clinic addresses the high cost of treatment by offering a donor oocyte program that waives the IVF fee for patients
willing to share half of their eggs with another woman. 35 The egg recipient in the program also pays less by forgoing the $2000 to $3000
cost for an oocyte donor. 36 I cannot imagine that this program would
help many Black patients, since it is unlikely that the predominantly
white clientele would be interested in donations of their eggs.
The racial disparity in the use of reproductive technologies may
be partially self-imposed. The myth that Black people are overly fertile may make infertility especially embarrassing for Black couples. 37
One Black woman who eventually sought IVF treatment explained,
"Being African-American, I felt that we're a fruitful people and it was
shameful to have this problem. That made it even harder." 38 Blacks
may find it more emotionally difficult to discuss their problem with a
physician, especially considering the paucity of Black specialists in this
field. Blacks may also harbor a well-founded distrust of technological
interference with their bodies and genetic material at the hands of
white physicians.
Finally, Blacks may have an aversion to the genetic marketing
aspect of the new reproduction. Black folks are skeptical about any
obsession with genes. TI1ey know that their genes are considered undesirab le and that this alleged genetic inferiority has been used for
centuries to justify their exclusion from the economic, political and
social mainstream. Only last year Richard H errnstein & Charles lVIurray's The Bell Curve was a national bestseller, and it reopene d the
public debate about racial differences in intelligence and the role genetics should play in social policy.39
Blacks have understandably resisted defining personal identity in
biological terms. Blacks by and large are more interested in escaping
the constraints of racist ideology by defining themselves 2part from
inherited traits. They tend to see group membership as a political and
35. C o oPER CENTER FOR IVF, Coop er Cenrer fo r lVF Resp onds to rh e Fenili1y Market, N.Y. T IMES, Jan . 1.:1., 1996, at 16 (adverti semen t) .
36. !d.
37. Martha Southgate , Coping with Jnfeni!iry, EssENCE , Sepi. 1994, ct 28, 28.
38. .!d.
39. See Richard J. H errnstein & Charles Murray, T HE BELL Cuxvc:: Ic r TC: LU GE:~; cE
AND C L ASS STRUCTURE I N AMERICAN L IFE

(199L1).
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cultural affiliation. Their family ties have traditionally reached beyond the bounds of the nuclear family to include extended kin and
non-kin relationships.
My experience has been that fertility services simply are not a
subject of conversation in Black circles, even among middle-class professionals. While I have recently noticed stories about infertility appearing in magazines with a Black middle-class readership such as
Ebony and Essence, these articles conclude by suggesting that childless Black couples seriously consider adoption. 40 Black professional
women I know are far more concerned about the assault that recent
welfare reform efforts are inflicting on our poorer sisters' right to bear
children-an assault that devalues all Black women and children in
America. 41
Moreover, Black women are also more concerned about the
higher rates of sterilization in our community, a disparity that cuts
across economic and educational lines. One study found that 9.7 percent of college-educated Black women had been sterilized, compared
to 5.6 percent of college-educated white women. 42 The frequency of
sterilization increased among poor and uneducated Black women.
Among women without a high school diploma, 31.6 percent of Black
women and 14.5 percent of white women had been sterilized. 4 3
B. The Importance of the Genetic Tie

R ace also influences the importance we place on IVF's central
aim-having genetically-related children.
Of course sharing a genetic tie with children is important to people of different races and in racially homogeneous cultures. Most parents I know take great satisfaction in ha';ing children who "take after
them. " It seems almost natural for people to want to pass down their
genes to their children, as if they achieve a form of immortality by
continuing their "blood line" into futur e generations.
Yet we also know that the desire to have genetically-related children is influenced, if not created, by our culture. A number of feminists have advocated abandoning the genetic model of parenthood
because of its origins in patriarchy and its "preoccupation with male
40. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 32, at 148; Southgate, supra note 37, at 28.
41. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Ciiizenship, 105 YALE
L.J. 1563, 1582 (1996) (book review).
42. LEVIN & TA UB, Reproductive Rights, in WoMEN AND THE LAw sec. 10A.07 [3J[b] ,
lOA-28 (C. Lefco urt ed., 1989).
43. Id.
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seed. "44 We should add to these concerns the tremendous impact that
the inheritability of race has had on the meaning of the genetic tie in
American culture.
The social and legal meaning of the genetic tie helped to maintain
a racial caste system that preserved white supremacy through a rule of
racial purity. 45 The contradiction of slavery existing in a republic
founded on a radical commitment to liberty required a theory of racial
hierarchy. Whites took the hereditary trait of race and endowed it
with the concept of racial superiority and inferiority; 46 they maintained a clear demarcation between Black slaves and white masters by
a violently enforced legal system of racial classification and sexual
taboos. 47
The genetic tie to a slave mother not only made the child a slave
and subject to white domination; it also passed down a whole set of
inferior traits. Children born to a slave, but fathered by the white
master, automatically became slaves, not members of the master's
family. To this day, one's social status in America is determined by
the presence or absence of a genetic tie to a Black parent. Conversely, the white genetic tie-if free from any trace of blackness--is
an extremely valuable attribute entitling a child to a privileged status,
what Cheryl Harris calls the "property interest in whiteness." 48
For several centuries a paramount objective of American law and
social convention was keeping the white bloodline free from Black
contamination. It was only in 1967 that the United States Supreme
Court in Loving v. Virginia 49 ruled antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional. Thus, ensuring genetic relatedness is important for many reasons, but, in America, one of thos e reasons has been to preserve white
racial purity.

44. Joan C. Callahan, Introduction to REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAw: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11 , at 1, 11. See, e.g., Rothman , supra note 11 , at 39; Christine Overall, ETHICS AND Hu MAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 149 (1987)
(noting that "the need for a genetic connection with one 's offspring seems to be of particular importance to men").
45. Roberts, supra note *, at 223-30.
46. See Step hen Jay Go uld, THE MrsMEASURE OF MAN (1981).
47. Barbara K. Kopytoff & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racial Puriry and Interracial
Sex in rhe Law of Colonial and A ntebellum Virginia, 77 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1967, 1967-68
(1989).
48. C heryl I. Harris, Whireness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1713 (1993).
49. 388 U.S . 1 (1967).
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C. ·value of Ted-ano~ogirallly Created Children

Finally, the new reproduction graphically reflects and reinforces
the disparate values placed on members of social groups.
The monumental effort , expense and technological invention that
goes into the new reproduction marks the children produced as especially valuable. It proclaims the unmistakable message that white children are precious enough to devote billions of dollars towards their
creation. Black children, on the other hand, are the primary object of
welfare reform measures designed to discourage poor women from
procreating.

H.

limpnk~tfioillls

f,mr Policy Regmrding the New Reproduction

\A/hat does it mean that we live in a country in which white women disproportionately use expensive technologies to enable them to
bear children, while Black women disproportionately undergo surgery
that prevents them from being able to bear any? Surely this contradiction must play a critical part in our deliberations about the morality
of these technologies. What exactly does race mean for our own understanding of the new reproduction?
Let us consider three possible responses. First, we might acknowledge that race influences the use of reproductive technologies,
but decide this does not justify interfering with individuals' liberty to
use them. Second, we could work to ensure greater access to these
technologies by lowering costs or including IVF in insurance plans.
Finally, we might determine that these technologies are h armful and
that their use should therefore be discouraged.

l rte liberal response to this racial disparity is that it stems fror.n
the econornic and social structure, not from individuals' use of reproducti've technologies. Protection of individuals' procreative liberty
should prohibit government intervention in the choice to use IVF, as
long as that choice itself d ces not harm anyone.5 Currently, there is
little go-vernment sup.e rvision of reproduction-assisting technologies,
an d ::-n.any proponents fear legal regulation of thes e new means of re -ororh
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cording to the liberal response, does the right to use these technologies entail any government obligation to provide access to them. And
if for cultural reasons Blacks choose not to use these technologies, tb_is
is no reason to deny them to people who have different cultural
values.
Perhaps we should not question infertile couples ' motives for
wanting genetically-related children. After all, people who have children the old-fashioned way may also practice a form of genetic selection when they choose a mate. The desire to share genetic traits with
our children may not reflect the eugenic notion that these particular
traits are superior to others; rather, as Barbara Berg notes, "these
characteristics may simply symbolize to the parents the child's connection to past generations and the ability to extend that lineage forward
into the future." 51 Several people have responded to my concerns
about race by explaining to me, "White couples want white children
not because of any belief in racial superiority, but because they want
children who are like them."
Moreover, the danger of government scrutiny of people's motives
for their reproductive decisions may override my concerns about racism. This danger leads some feminists who oppose the practice of
using abortion as a sex selection technique, for example, nevertheless
to oppose its legal prohibition.52 As Tabitha Powledge explained:
To forbid women to use prenatal diagnostic techniques as a way of
picking the sexes of their babies is to begin to delineate acceptable
and unacceptable reasons to have an abortion ... . I hate these
technologies, but I do not want to see them legally regulated because, quite simply, I do not want to provide an opening wedge for
legal regulation of reproduction in generaP 3

It would be similarly unwise to permit the government to question
individuals' reasons for deciding to use reproduction-assisting
technologies.
B.

The D istributive

§oHUJlitUO!lil

The distributive solution does not question individuals' motives in
order to question the societal impact of a practice.54 This approach to
Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the Infertile, in REPRODUCTION , En-Isupra note 11, at 80, 82.
52. Joan C. Callahan, Introduction, Parr II: Prenatal and Postnatal Authority to R EPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11, at 133-134.
53. Tabitha M. Powledge, Unnatural Selection: Orz Choosing Children's Sex, in TEE
CusTO M -MADE CHILD?: V/oiviEN · CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 193, 197 (H elen B. Holmes et
al. eds., 1981).
54. See O verall, supm nore
at 17-39.
51.

ICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECfiVES ,
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procreative liberty places more importance on reproduction's social
context than does the liberal focus on the fulfillment of individual
desires. 55 Policies governing reproduction not only affect an individual's personal identity; they also shape the way we value each other
and interpret social problems. The social harm that stems from confining the new reproduction largely to the hands of wealthy white
couples might be a reason to demand equalized access to these
technologies.
Obviously the unequal distribution of wealth in our society prevents the less well off from buying countless goods and services that
wealthy people can afford. But there may be a reason why we should
be especially concerned about this disparity when it applies to
reproduction.
Reproduction is special. Government policy concerning reproduction has tremendous power to affect the status of entire groups of
people. This is why the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma declared the right to bear children to be "one of the basic civil rights of
man." 56 "In evil or reckless hands," Justice Douglas wrote, the government's power to sterilize "can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear." 57 This explains
why in the Casey opinion Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
stressed the importance the right to an abortion had for women's
equal social status. It is precisely the connection between reproduction and human dignity that makes a system of procreative liberty that
privileges the wealthy and powerful particularly disturbing.
Procreative liberty's importance to human dignity is a compelling
reason to guarantee the equal distribution of procreative resources in
society. Moreover, the power of unequal access to these resources to
entrench unjust social hierarchies is just as pernicious as government
interference in wealthy individuals' expensive procreative choices.
'Ne might therefore address the racial disparity in the use of reproductive technologies by ensuring through public spending that their use is
not concentrated among affluent white people. Government subsidies, such as :rviedicaid coverage of IVF, and legislation mandating pri55. For a more extended critique of the liberal approach to reprodu-::tion-assisting
technologies, see D orothy E. Roberts, Social Justice, Procreative Liberty, and the Limits of
Liberal Theory: Robertson's Children of Choice, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 601 (1995); Joan C.
Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist Social Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal Theory , _ KY. L. REv. _
(forthcoming 1996).
56. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
57. !d.
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vate insurance coverage of IVF would allow more diverse and
widespread enjoyment of the new reproduction.
C.

Should We Discourage the New Reproduction?

If these technologies are in some ways positively harmful, will ex-

panding their distribution in society solve the problem? The racial
critique of the new reproduction is more unsettling than just its exposure of the maldistribution of fertility services. It also challenges the
importance that we place on genetics and genetic ties.
But can we limit individuals' access to these technologies without
critically trampling our protection of individual freedom from unwarranted government intrusion? After all, governments have perpetrated as much injustice on the theory that individual interests must be
sacrificed for the public good as they have on the theory that equality
must be sacrificed for individual liberty. This was the rationale justifying eugenic sterilization laws enacted earlier in this century.58
Even for liberals, individuals' freedom to use reproductive technologies is not absolute. Most liberals would place some limit on their
use, perhaps by defining the legitimate reasons for procreation. 59 If a
core view of reproduction can limit individuals' personal procreative
decisions, then why not consider a view that takes into account reproduction's role in social arrangements of wealth and power? If the
harm to an individual child or even to a core notion of procrearion can
justify barring her parents from using the technique of their choice,
then why not the new reproduction's potential for worsening group
inequality?
Some have concluded that the harms caused by certain reproduction-assisting practices justify their prohibition. In 1985, for example,
the United Kingdom passed the Surrogacy Arrangements Act banning coiTLmercial contract pregnancy arrangements and imposing fin es
and/or imprisonment on the brokers who negotiate these agreements.60 Some Iv'I arxist and radical feminists agree that paid preg58. See Mark H. Haller , E ugenics: Hereditarian A ttitudes in American Tho ught
(1963).
59. See, e.g., Robe rtson, supra note 2, at 167 (positing "a core view of the goa ls and
values of reproduction " tha t limits an individual's right to shape offspring characteristi cs) .
60. Rosemari e Tong, Fem inist Perspectives on Gestational Mo th erhood: The Search
f or a Unified Focus, in REPR O DUCTION, ETH~ CS , AND THE L.A.W: F E MIN IST PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 11 , a t 55,58 (citing Surrogacy Arrangeme nts Act, 1985, U nited Kingdom , C hapter 49, p.2 (1) (a)(b)(c)) .
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nancy contracts should be criminalized to prevent their exploitation
and commodification of women and children.6 1
On the other hand, the government need not depart at all from
the liberal noninterference model of rights in order to discourage or
refuse to support practices that contribute to social injustice. 62 Even
the negative view of liberty that protects procreative choice from government intrusion leaves the state free to decide not to lend assistance
to the fertility business or its clients.
We may therefore question a practice that channels millions of
dollars into the fertility business, rather than spending si..rnilar
amounts on programs that would provide more extensive benefits to
infertile people. New York Times writer Trip Gabriel describes IVF
clinics as "[a] virtually free-market branch of medicine, the $350 million-a-year business has been largely exempt from government regulation and from the downward pressure on costs that insurance
companies exert. "63
Indeed, we can no longer avoid these concerns about the social
costs and benefits of IVF. Such calculations are now part of the debate surrounding the advisability of state laws requiring insurance
companies to include the cost of fertility treatment in their coverage.
A study recently reported in the New England Journal of Medicine
calculated the real cost of IVF at approximately $67,000 to $114,000
per successful delivery.64 The authors concluded that the debate
about insurance coverage must take into account these economic implications of IVF, as well as ethical and social judgments about resource allocation.6s
Black women in particular would he better served by a focus on
the basic improvement of conditions that lead to infertility, such as
occupational and environmental hazards, diseases, and complications
following childbirth and abortion. 66

61. !d. at 64-68.
62. Call a han & Ro be rts, sup ra note 55.
63. G abriel, supra note 20, a t 10.
64. Peter J. Neum an et a!. , The Cost of a Successful D elivery with In Vitro Fertilization, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 23 9, 23 9 (1994). Unlike the $8,000 cost per !VF cycle me ntioned above, the figu res quoted in this study refer to the cost involved in the birth of at
le ast one live baby as a result of a n IVF cycle .
65 . !d.
66. See Nadi ne Ta ub , Surrogacy: A Preferred Treatm en t fo r Infenility ?, 16 L. ME o. &
HE ALT H CAR E 89 (1 988) .
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Taking these social justice concerns more seriously, then, might
justify government efforts to reallocate resources away from expensive reproductive technologies.

Conclusion
These are thorny questions. It is extremely difficult to untangle
white couples' reasons for using reproduction-assisting technologies
and Black couples' reasons for avoiding them. Evidence is hard to
come by: what doctor or fertility clinic will admit (at least publicly) to
steering Black women away from their services? Few people seem to
want to confront the obvious complexion of this field. Moreover, the
problems raised by the racial disparity in the use of these technologies
will not be solved merely by attempting to expand their distribution.
Indeed, the concerns I have raised in this essay may be best addressed
by placing restrictions on the use and development of the technologies, restrictions imposed by the government or encouraged by moral
persuasion. This possibility is met by a legitimate concern about protection of our private decisions from government scrutiny. Indeed,
Black women are most vulnerable to government efforts to control
their reproductive lives.
Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the negative impact that the racial
disparity and imagery of the new reproduction can have on racial inequality in America. Our vision of procreative liberty must include the
eradication of group oppression, and not just a concern for protecting
the reproductive choices of the most privileged. It must also include
alternative conceptions of the family and the significance of genetic
relatedness that truly challenge the dominant meaning of family.

